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 Fatigue is a well-studied topic in aviation.  As in many industries, aviation 
service providers must balance the hazards of fatigue in the workplace along with 
other risks to provide a product the consumer values and has confidence in, ensure 
a safe work environment, and protect resources.  Aviation does have unique risks, 
especially when considered cumulatively:  complex machines, harsh operating 
environments, regulated long work periods that cover a 24-hour, 7-day a week 
cycle, and extended periods of inactivity for flight crew members sandwiched in 
between relatively brief, high-intensity workloads.  These factors, which are often 
in flux, make managing fatigue difficult for all stakeholders.  The Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) made significant rule changes to reduce risk exposure due 
to fatigue by reducing the amount of flight time allowed for pilots to fly, increasing 
the required time off between flight duty periods, and mandating fatigue 
management training for flight crews (FAA, 2011).  However, certain elements, 
such as fitness for duty and responsibility for commuting, while specifically 
addressed and defined in the regulatory documents, are largely left up to individual 
flight crew member determination. 
 
 The FAA has also implemented requirements for certificate holders to 
develop a Safety Management System (SMS) within their organizations (FAA, 
2015) which, among other fundamentals, advocates the establishment of strong 
safety culture. This includes both a reporting and just culture to encourage the 
reporting of safety issues without the threat of retaliation (Stolzer & Goglia, 2015).  
A significant element of the FAA’s prescriptive flight duty rules and requirements 
is the obligation of flight crews to manage and account for their fatigue and fitness 
for duty.   The certificate holder has an obligation to facilitate this as well, starting 
with a safety policy that includes a commitment to fatigue management.  It is within 
the framework of a functioning SMS that the challenges of managing fatigue and 
the hazards produced by it need to be addressed.  
 
 This article explores the current state of fatigue management in the industry 
and the role the current prescriptive structure of the regulatory environment is 
having on reducing the hazards associated with fatigue.  Included is a brief review 
of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) reports on two commercial 
aviation accidents where fatigue was indicated as a factor.  Finally, it will highlight 
the benefits of using a Fatigue Risk Management System (FRMS), within the 
framework of the organization’s functioning SMS, to conduct research and data 
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Rules, Regulations, and Advisories 
 
Part 117   
 
 Following testimony in the US Congress regarding fatigue in commercial 
aviation, the FAA instituted a thorough process to amend its flight, duty, and rest 
rules under 14 Code of Federal Register (CFR) Parts 117,119, and 121 Flight Crew 
Member Duty and Rest Requirements (referred to in the industry as “Part 117”).  
This was published in January 2012, with an effective date two years later of 
January 14, 2014.  These supplanted rules that had been in place nearly 70 years. 
With Part 117, the FAA took a systems approach to fatigue management, 
acknowledging that mitigating the risks that fatigue poses to passenger travel will 
need both the carrier and flight crew member to accept responsibility.  Part 117 is 
very detailed, prescriptive, and incorporated into the Federal Register.  Included in 
the document is an educational primer on fatigue, examples of accidents caused in 
part by fatigue, a history of recommendations made by the NTSB, and input from 
various stakeholders throughout the rulemaking process.  The rule includes tables 
detailing work/rest rules that list start times, the number of flight segments and 
consecutive days worked, attempting to prescriptively manage fatigue based upon 
these objective factors.  Included is a clarification on the requirement for regular 
education of flight crew members on the effects of fatigue, available mitigating 
strategies, and the importance of being fit for duty.  Also, as referenced in the rule, 
the FAA has promulgated numerous circulars, articles, and newsletters concerning 
the effects and management of fatigue and various education programs and tools 
for service providers.  Most of these are either advisory or voluntary and offer a 
wealth of information to assist both flight crew members and operators not only to 
comply with the regulation but more importantly, understand the challenges that 
fatigue presents.  Two of these warrant a closer look:  Advisory Circular (AC) 120-
103A, Fatigue Risk Management Systems, and AC 117-3, Fitness for Duty. 
 
Fatigue Risk Management Systems    
 
 The objectives of an FRMS, as advocated by the FAA, are to “manage, 
monitor, and mitigate the effects of fatigue to improve flight crew member alertness 
and reduce performance errors” as well as to balance safety and productivity (FAA, 
2013).  FRMS is a voluntary program, and the circular describes itself as an 
acceptable means of implementation.  The AC lists four tools: data collection, 
analysis, identification of causes, and application of procedures.  The key to this 
process is the collection and usage of existing data collection systems.  These 
include Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA), the Aviation Safety Action 
Program (ASAP), and the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS).  The FAA 
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recommends this information be analyzed, for example, by using a Root Cause 
Analysis (RCA) to determine if the events described in the report can be attributed 
to fatigue.  Also emphasized is the need to have an open and just reporting system, 
intrinsic to SMS principles, to ensure this information remains attainable.  
Correspondingly, listed in the document is assignment of roles and responsibilities 
of both the certificate holder and individual employees. Similar to fundamentals of 
an SMS, the FRMS is data driven and based upon valid scientific principles. The 
FRMS allows certificate holders more flexibility and complements the prescriptive 
regulations on flight duty and rest requirements (FAA, 2013). 
 
Fitness for Duty   Worthy of examination as it pertains to the thesis of this article 
is AC 117-3, Fitness for Duty.  Drawing from Part 117, this AC defines fit for duty 
as “being physiologically and mentally prepared and capable of performing the 
assigned duties at the highest degree of safety” (Part 117, Section 117.3). The 
purpose of this AC is to help certificate holders and flight crew members understand 
their responsibilities under Part 117 and acceptable methods of compliance.  It 
specifically targets commuting, and guides educate flight crew members on the 
potential effects of commuting on fatigue.  The emphasis on commuting is 
noteworthy, as this aspect of commercial aviation is largely unregulated.  The AC 
emphasized that fitness for duty be a joint responsibility between flight crew 
members and the certificate holder.   
 
Fatigue in Commercial Aviation 
 
 The effects of fatigue have been studied for decades, and the hazards 
induced by fatigue are well documented in both scientific studies and accident 
investigations.  The NTSB has cited fatigue as a contributing factor in multiple 
investigations, and as far back as 1972, expressed concerns about the effects of 
fatigue, sleep and circadian effects on performance (FAA, 2011).  While fatigue 
can be a hazard in numerous professions, as previously indicated it presents some 
unique challenges in aviation.  Many are intrinsic to the industry however fatigue 
may be to a degree self-induced by choices made by the individuals themselves due 
to the liberal travel privileges many flight crew members in the commercial aviation 
industry possess. 
 
 Mallis, Banks and Dinges begin their discussion of fatigue with the classical 
definition, “a decrease in performance capability as a function of time on task” and 
further stress that this formed the basis for FAA duty time regulations for over 70 
years (2010, P. 401).  There exist more current and scientific definitions, and all 
share common themes.  These can relate to the manner in which it was accumulated. 
For example, acute fatigue is related to the effects with short-term duty.  This 
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contrasts with chronic fatigue, which is associated with consecutive work periods 
whereby insufficient rest causes the effects to mount up (Nunes & Cabon, 2015).  
The FAA describes it in a similar form, labeling fatigue as transient (acute), 
cumulative (chronic), and adds category labeled circadian.  This last classification 
describes reduced performance typically during the hours of 2 a.m. to 6 a.m., 
referred to as WOCL, for Window of Circadian Low (FAA, 2011).  Also described 
in this FAA document and, just as important to the discussion, are the effects of 
fatigue.  These include attention lapses, reduced performance, delayed reactions, 
impaired decision making, reduced situational awareness, and lowered drive to 
perform elective tasks.   
 
 A review of the literature reveals significant research in fatigue and fatigue 
management.  Fatigue is recognized as a threat that affects alertness and cognitive 
performance; it is evident from experience that humans are simply not constructed 
to operate efficiently on around-the-clock schedules (Mallis, Banks & Dinges, 
2010).   Several research driven models of fatigue management have been proposed 
and studied.  Dr. Rosekind and his associates at Alertness Solutions of Cupertino, 
CA developed and studied a comprehensive program labeled Alertness 
Management Program (AMP) that included education, scheduling, alertness 
strategies, and the promotion of healthy sleep (Rosekind, Gregory & Mallis, 2006).  
The goal of AMP is to apply scientific data to actual policies and improve 
scheduling practices.  Another model is SAFTE, for Sleep, Activity, Fatigue, and 
Task Effectiveness.  This model combines sleep/wake history with daily circadian 
cycles to produce a “percent effectiveness” scale (Rangan & Van Dongen, 2013). 
The concept behind this model is to determine the threshold for an acceptable level 
of fatigue and apply that to duty scheduling in commercial aviation.  
 
 The most current approach endorsed by the FAA is the FRMS, as was 
introduced above (FAA, 2013).   The FAA recognizes the value of these systems 
by allowing companies with an approved FRMS to deviate from the prescriptive 
requirements for flight duty management and have more latitude to meet regulatory 
requirements. Two challenges to implementing FRMS are commonly identified: 
determining which types of data are to be monitored and the methods to do that, 
and how to measure the effectiveness of FRMS in managing risk (Gander, Mangie, 
Van Den Berg, Smith, Mulrine & Signal, 2014).  Similar to modern safety 
management systems, FRMS is necessarily data driven.  However, unlike routinely 
collected flight data, for example, FOQA, monitoring and recording measurements 
of crew fatigue can require considerable resources (Gander et al., 2014).  Voluntary 
reporting systems as explained in the accepted descriptions of SMS can be effective 
tools in monitoring the FRMS, as can auditing regimens such as the Line 
Operational Safety Audit (LOSA).   
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 Colgan Air 3407 & UPS 1354 
 
 Two serious aviation accidents juxtapose the FAA’s issuance of the new 
Part 117 Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest Requirements and are illustrative of 
the complex issues surrounding the management of fatigue:  Colgan Air 3407 
(2009) and UPS 1354 (2011).   Focusing first on Colgan Air, the NTSB listed as 
the probable cause the captain’s inappropriate response to a stall warning during a 
landing approach in icing conditions (NTSB, 2011).  The report detailed several 
issues discovered regarding training practices and adherence to Crew Resource 
Management (CRM) principles.  What is most significant about Colgan Air 3407, 
however, is it became the catalyst to reopen discussion/debate concerning the 
regulations on aircrew member duty time and rest requirements, reaching all the 
way to the floor of Congress (Arnoult, 2009).  This was due in large part from the 
commuting habits of the flight crew revealed during the investigation.   
 
 There were four items listed in the report’s findings that related to fatigue.  
None were listed as a contributory cause of the accident.  The report states that:  1. 
Fatigue likely impaired this crew’s performance, 2. This crew had a responsibility 
to manage their work/rest schedule and did not do so, 3. Colgan Air did not 
“proactively address pilot fatigue hazards” at a hub that is associated with 
commuting pilots, and 4. Operators like Colgan Air have a responsibility to do so.  
Following testimony in Congress, the FAA initiated the process to update and 
amend 14 CFR Parts 117, 119, and 121 Flight Crew Member Duty and Rest 
Requirements (referred to in the industry as “Part 117”).  This was published 
January 4, 2014.   
 
 The crash of United Parcel Service UPS 1354 also revealed systemic issues 
with training, dispatch, serious breakdowns in CRM, and failure to comply with 
company Standard Operating Procedures (SOP).  Significant in the NTSB report, 
however, is the board’s determination that the first officer’s fatigue was 
contributory and was due to her “ineffective off-duty time management” (NTSB, 
2013).  The report noted that while UPS, as an all-cargo carrier, was not required 
to comply with Part 117, the schedule the crew was flying met those requirements.  
It was discovered during the investigation that the first officer engaged in personal 
travel during a layover and did not get adequate rest.  Furthermore, it appears she 
was aware of her fatigued state but elected not to comply with company fatigue 
policy and procedures.   
 
 The reluctance of the first officer to call in fatigued was investigated by the 
board.  It was noted that UPS has a flight duty/crew rest policy that is more stringent 
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than required by rule and is defined in a collective bargaining agreement between 
the company and the pilot’s union, the International Pilot’s Association (IPA).  The 
agreement requires that crew members who call in fatigued have an obligation to 
submit a report detailing the circumstances that prevented them from getting the 
proper rest before duty.  If it is determined to be the crew member’s fault, they 
would be charged sick time and the event noted in the crew member’s file.  An IPA 
representative cited in the report believed this to be punitive in nature.  This, of 
course, is in direct conflict with the core tenants of SMS.  To that end, the board 
recommended to both UPS and the IPA to perform a review of the process used to 
report fatigue and its effectiveness as a non-punitive method to address fatigue. 
 
SMS and Managing Fatigue 
 
 The application of SMS to fatigue management is fundamental; fatigue is a 
recognized hazard in aviation and managing the risk it creates is basic to 
maintaining a sound SMS.  This requires that the foundational elements of the SMS 
be first established.  Starting with Safety Policy, the company, through its senior 
management structure, must make clear the policy and procedures to be followed 
and the accountability of each member of the organization to comply.  This is 
particularly important with regards to fatigue since the management of it to a great 
part requires flight crew member self-identification and reporting.  Whereas the 
prescriptive duty rules of Part 117 are well defined, regarding defining fatigue, the 
FAA “simply chose not to impose a mandatory regulatory requirement because the 
signs used to identify fatigue cannot be synthesized into a general objective 
standard” (Part 117, p. 349).  Thus, company Safety Policy, as defined by the SMS, 
must ensure that the standards expected are understood and complied with.  
 
 As explained in the AC, not all certificate holders may have the need to 
implement an FRMS due to various operational factors.  However, all are required 
to submit a Fatigue Risk Management Plan (FRMP) consisting of: 
 
 • senior-level management commitment  
 • fatigue management policies and procedures 
 • flight time, duty period, and rest plan 
 • a fatigue reporting program 
 • an education and awareness training program; 
• system for monitoring flight crew fatigue and evaluating the FRMP 
(Council, N.R., 2012) 
 
An FRMS and an FRMP is a method to manage and mitigate risk through the 
company’s existing safety management process (FAA, 2013). 
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  Incorporation of an FRMS works in parallel with the elements of the Safety 
Risk Management component of the organization’s SMS.  As described in the FAA 
circular, the FRMS, as a data-driven process, can be a stand-alone system or be 
incorporated into the organization’s existing SMS.  As with other hazards in the 
industry, employing risk management tools can identify and subsequently 
eliminate/mitigate/control risks.  Specifically, for fatigue, these can include 
strategic crew duty and rest period scheduling based upon actual scientifically 
validated results. 
 
 Likewise, the FRMS supports the Safety Assurance component of SMS by 
providing, among other things, performance monitoring and a system of employee 
reporting.  As explained by Stolzer & Goglia, this includes a management review 
and a plan to incorporate what is learned into current operations to reduce risk and 
ensure continuous improvement (2015).  Safety Assurance relies on documentation 
and encourages participation so that personnel will not fear retribution for reporting 
deviations. A key element of this process, as explained in the AC, is the need for 
the organization to distinguish between unintentional human error that may have 
been caused by fatigue versus intentional non-compliance with rules, SOP, and the 
need for a separate system from FRMS to consider deliberate violations (FAA, 
2013).   
 
 Finally, the fourth pillar of SMS, Safety Promotion, needs to establish safety 
as a core value with a sustained Safety Culture.  As was discovered in the Colgan 
Air and UPS crashes, a breakdown in the safety culture at multiple levels created a 
situation where poor decisions were made that were not trapped.  Safety Promotion 
provides the tools to promote safety with training, communication, and awareness 
(Stolzer & Goglia, 2015).  A fatigue Education and Awareness Training Program 
is mandated in Part 117 and a required element of an approved FRMS.  Figure 1 
shows the relationship of SMS to an FRMS.  Ultimately, the level at which it 
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 Commercial aviation presents a wide variety of challenges and 
opportunities to consider when developing a fatigue management strategy.  
Commercial pilots can traverse multiple time zones and often need to perform for 
exceptionally long periods of many days (FAA, 2011).  On the other hand, 
commercial pilots often have larger breaks between work cycles, enabling 
restorative sleep periods not necessarily afforded in other professions.  All of these 
factors must be considered in the development and deployment of an FRMS. 
However, to be effective, the FRMS needs valid and reliable data.    
 
 The establishment of an SMS requires sound and comprehensive safety 
policies and practices.  Violations of these polices can and have led to tragic 
consequences.  Fatigue, although intrinsic to both domestic and worldwide aviation 
operations, is manageable provided that the hazards are evaluated in total and the 
risks identified.  The FRMS must actively pursue data, analyze the data, and 
provide solutions to both management and line flight crew members to better 
understand and control fatigue. This can be done using data generated through 
existing reporting systems.  FOQA, ASAP, and LOSA are good examples.  
Comparing reported deviations of standard operating procedures or air traffic 
control clearances against factors such as time of day, time on duty, cumulative 
work days, etc., may yield correlations useful in an FRMS.  FRMS should also 
employ specific methodology as described in the AMP and SAFTE programs.  
Gander et al. suggest developing performance indicators from routine scheduling 
data to monitor the impact of schedule changes on risk assessment and target the 
causes of fatigue risk, i.e., early departures coupled with extended duty days (2014). 
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Other solutions would be to require commuting factors to be included in the 
calculation of duty time.  As discussed in a National Academy of Sciences (NAS) 
report titled The Effects of Commuting on Pilot Fatigue, this method exists in at 
least one known collective bargaining agreement (Council N.R., 2012). Finally, 
further increasing the use of automation may provide some relief in the future, but 




In March/April 2014, a team of researchers from Purdue University 
conducted a survey of commercial pilots on their perceptions of the recently 
enacted Part 117 (Rudari, Johnson, Geske & Sperlak, 2016).  The team developed 
a Likert-scale survey asking questions on the impact of the new rules on alertness, 
fatigue levels, sleep cycles, aircraft operation and overall safety.  Also included in 
the survey instrument was a comment section that allowed for additional, open-
ended input. The survey had a total of 92 participants.   
 
The results from the Likert section was mixed, with many of the respondents 
indicating neither a positive nor negative impact.   The researchers suggest this may 
be attributed to the relative newness of the rule.  The open-ended section, on the 
other hand, was completed by approximately one-half of the respondents and 
clearly indicated a negative perception among these pilots, particularly concerning 
the cargo carrier exclusion and crew rest issues regarding long haul operations.  As 
stated in the study, the overall conclusions may be biased since the survey was 
conducted within months of the rule being put into effect. However, the comments 
and concerns reported by pilots in the open-ended section could be useful in future 
research efforts on this subject (Rudari et al., 2016). 
Summary 
 
 Part 117 is clear that fatigue management is a combined responsibility of 
the certificate holder and the flight crew member.  Compliance with the detailed 
and prescriptive elements of the CFR and related ACs about flight, duty day and 
rest rules do not relieve any of the affected parties of their obligations to ensure all 
personnel is fit for duty.  The NAS study was sponsored by the FAA and is a 
thorough examination of fatigue in the aviation community in general, with a focus 
on the nature of commuting unique to the industry.  It found a wide variety of 
policies and procedures, due in part, to the unregulated aspect of commuting.  Many 
are based upon collective bargaining agreements. However, the report concluded 
that “no systemic, reliable information was available to the committee about the 
effects, if any, of commuting pilots, reliably arriving at their domicile on time for 
duty or about the effects, if any, on either fatigue or fatigue calls” (Council, N.R., 
9
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2012. p. 44).  Crewmember insights are an essential element of fatigue management 
and must be included in working this problem. 
 
 Thus, research needs to continue on fatigue and airline scheduling practices 
using data from all available sources.  This includes commuting habits, rest 
opportunities, and their potential effect on crew fitness and compliance with the 
intent and goals of Part 117.  With this information, procedures, policies, and 
practices can be developed and implemented to improve fatigue management.  An 
adequate rest facilities at major hubs or compensation incentives to report to the 
domicile with enough time to secure appropriate rest before scheduled report time 
should be considered, for example.  Ultimately, the FRMS, functioning as a 
component of the organization’s SMS, will yield and maintain a safety culture 
whereby operating aircraft in a fatigued state, whether from the crewmember’s 
domicile or an en route location, is recognized and treated as unacceptable by all 
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